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Article 5

CONTRACTING FOR NO-FAULT LIABILITY INSURANCE
COVERING DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS*
JEFFREY O'CONNELLt

Chancellor Allen Wallis of the University of Rochester told the
1974 graduating class of his university's medical school:
You who are receiving degrees in medicine . . . undoubtedly

realize that throughout the country at this season thousands of
others are receiving similar degrees in token of their preparation,
like yours, for devoting the best parts of their lives to improving
the health of their fellow men.
Most of you are vaguely aware, also, that all over the country
even larger numbers are emerging from professional schools of
another sort, namely schools of law. Probably few of you realize,
however, that before your careers have run .their courses those
lawyers may have more influence than you have over what you
do, how you do it, and how you are rewarded.
You may find lawyers defining the range of treatments that
you are allowed to use in specified circumstances. Lawyers may
prescribe the criteria by which you are to choose among the
allowable treatments. Lawyers may specify the priorities you must
assign to different patients. Lawyers may require you to keep
detailed records to establish at all times that you are in full compliance. Lawyers may punish you unless you can refute ...

their

presumption that your failures result from not following all of
their rules, regulations, and requirements. And lawyers may decide what incomes you deserve.
The lawyers have you outnumbered, but on the average they
are no match for you in intelligence, industry or dedication. Just
don't let them ambush you while you are absorbed in caring for
the sick.'
*

This article is part of a series of publications by the author on no-fault

insurance including his book, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No-FAULT INSURANCE FOR
PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975). The project has been funded by grants from the
John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, Consumers Union, the Foundation for
Insurance Research Study and Training (FIRST) of the League Insurance Group
of Michigan, and the Center for Advanced Study, University of Illinois.
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois; A.B., Dartmouth College, 1951;
J.D., Harvard University, 1954.

1. Address by Allen Wallis, Commencement Exercises, School of Medicine and
Dentistry, University of Rochester, May 26, 1974.
In the New York Times of February 25, 1975, Harry Schwartz, a member
of the Times' Editorial Board in an article entitled "Will Medicine Be Strangled in
the Law," commented on Chancellor Wallis' remarks:
It is less than a year since Chancellor Wallis made that forecast, but the
passage of time has only strengthened the probability that he is right . ...
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As a lawyer and a law professor, perhaps I am disqualified from
contesting Chancellor Wallis' comparative appraisal of these two learned
professions. But I admit we lawyers have hardly acquitted ourselves
favorably in structuring the law of medical malpractice. We have
created a legal-insurance mechanism for dealing with adverse results
from medical care that is mired in delay, waste, cruelty, hardship and
acrimony. What can be done about it? One possible approach might
be a medical malpractice insurance system based on the concept of
no-fault.
Consider, for instance, the recent trends in automobile liability.
Under the old tort system, when Smith and Jones collide in their cars,
Jones' insurance company pays Smith only if Smith proves Jones
guilty, and himself guiltless, of faulty driving. As an "innocent" party
claiming against a "wrongdoer," Smith, if successful in his claim, is
compensated not only for his out-of-pocket loss (principally wage loss
and medical expenses) but also for the pecuniary value of his pain
and suffering. But ordinarily it is difficult to establish fault and to
assign a pecuniary value to the amount of pain suffered. Furthermore,
in the relatively rare case in which there is recovery, payment is usually
long delayed. The pool of insurance money is largely consumed, not
by payment for losses, but by administrative expenses - insurance
overhead and expensive experts negotiating and fighting over who and
what is to be paid.'
More laws involving medicine have been passed this last decade than in all
of the rest of the United States history before 1965. Through Medicare,
Medicaid and other programs, the Government pays for an ever-increasing portion of all medical care in this country, and it is increasingly demanding the
right to control what it is paying for. Simultaneously, however, Government
is increasing the stringency of its controls over all branches of medical care,
regardless of who pays for it.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1975, at 35, cols. 1-3.

2. For a discussion for the layman of both common law tort liability and
no-fault auto insurance, see J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY: AND THE REMEDY
[hereinafter cited as O'CONNELL, THE INJURY
OF No-FAULT INSURANCE (1971)
INDUSTRY].
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For auto accidents the solution that has been increasingly adopted
across the country is no-fault insurance. Sixteen states have enacted
reasonably effective no-fault laws to cover automobile accidents. 8
Under such laws, after the collision between Smith and Jones, each
is paid by his own insurance company regardless of anyone's fault.
Payment is made to each victim periodically as his out-of-pocket losses
accrue, this being an easier and more practical system than one which
pays a lump sum that includes the monetary value of pain. Since each
victim is paid by his own insurance company, each is required to
abandon his tort claim, based on fault, against the other party. With
the resultant savings in legal fees - no-fault insurance has been called
"no lawyer" insurance - and the abandonment of claims for nonpecuniary losses, more people receive payments from the insurance pool
and the pool requires fewer dollars.
3. The following is a list of such states and their no-fault statutes. The first
sections cited are the provisions defining no-fault benefits, and the second sections
cited are the provisions concerning the extent to which tort rights are abolished.
Colorado: CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-4-706, 10-4-705(2); § 10-4-714

(1973).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-320, 38-319(b), 38-338, 38-321
(a) ; § 38-323(a) (Supp. 1976).
Florida: FA. STAT. ANN. §§ 627.736, 627.733(4); § 627.737 (1972).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-3403b, 56-3408b, 56-3407b; § 56-3410b (Supp.
1976).
Hawaii: HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 294-2(10), 294-3; §§ 294-6(a), 294-10(b)
(Supp. 1974).

Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3103, 40-3109(a) (4), 40-3116(c) ; § 40-3117
(Supp. 1974).

Kentucky: Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.39-020(2), -020(5), -130, -160,
-030; § 304.39-060 (Supp. 1974).
Massachusetts: MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, §§ 34A, 34N; ch. 231, § 6D,
ch. 90, § 34M (Supp. 1975).

Michigan: MIcH. CoMP. LAWs ANN. §§ 500.3107, 500.3108, 500.3113, 500.3115,
500.3171, 500.3172; § 500.3135 (Supp. 1975-1976).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65B.44, 65B.63, 65R.64, 65B.46; § 65B.51
(Supp. 1975-1976).
Nevada: NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 698.070, 698.230, 698.380; 698.280(h) (1973).
New Jersey: N.J. Rsv. STAT. § 39:6A-4; §§ 39:6A-8, 39:6A-12 (1973).
New York: N.Y. INs. LAW §§ 671.1, 672.1; §§ 673(1), 671(2) (b) (McKinney Supp. 1975-1976).

North Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-41-03(2); §§ 26-41-03(18), 26-41-12
(Supp. 1975).

Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, §§ 1009.103, .108, .201, 202; tit 40,
1009.301 (Supp. 1976-1977).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 31-41-6, 31-41-7; § 31-41-9(1) (1974).
For a discussion of the distinction between a genuine no-fault law and a
"spurious" or so-called add-on law, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1972, at 55, cols. 1-2.
Under a genuine no-fault law, no-fault benefits are accompanied to some extent by

§
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Under the old tort system, those who suffer losses from events
other than auto accidents face an even bleaker prospect. Prior to
reform, many people injured in traffic accidents were at least paid
a large total sum. But for other types of accidents the prospect of
being paid and the delays in receiving any payment are much more
discouraging. The medical malpractice situation is particularly bad.
Here the issues are extremely complex, with an even greater portion
of the insurance premium dollar being consumed by insurance overhead and legal fees. Although the insurance premiums of doctors
in some specialties currently reach $20,000 or more, the victims of
medical misadventure are not likely to see any of that money. According to a United States Senate study, "The lion's share of the
total cost to the insurance companies of malpractice suits and claims
goes to the legal community." 4 One expert estimates that "[only]
between 16 and 17 cents of the premium dollar ends up as benefits to
victims of medical injuries, ' 5 in contrast to 93 cents for Blue Cross,
83 cents for much health insurance, and 44 cents for the deservedly
maligned tort liability auto insurance system. 6
Some visionaries perceive national health insurance as a solution
to the problems plaguing the compensation of medical malpractice
victims. But if and when national health insurance is enacted, it
will cover only a relatively small portion of the personal injury losses
suffered by accident victims. In the case of medical malpractice claims,
wage losses make up 74 percent of total injury losses while only 24
percent are medical losses (with two percent for "other expenses").,
an abolition of the right to sue based on who is at fault in causing the accident
Under an "add-on" no-fault law no-fault benefits are provided with no abolition of
the right to sue for pain and suffering based on fault.
4. SUBcOM. ON EXECUTIVE REORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS,

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THE PATIENT VERSUS

THE PHYSICIAN,

91st Cong., Ist Sess., 2 (Comm. Print 1969).
5. CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
A DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION AND QUALITY CONTROL SYSTEMS, A
CENTER OCCASIONAL

PAPER

5, (D. McDonald, ed., 1971). See also O'Connell, An

Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many
Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 506-09 (1976) [hereinafter cited as O'Connell,
An Alternative].

6. Warne, Let's Hear from the Insurance Consumer, 36 INS. COUNS. J. 494, 496
For a general discussion of the inadequacies of the common law medical
malpractice liability system, see O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 501-12.
(1969).

7.

INSURANCE

SERVICES

OFFICE,

REPORT

TO THE

ALL-INDUSTRY

COMMITTEE,

SPECIAL MALPRACTICE REVIEW: 1974 CLOSED-CLAIMS SURVEY, PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
OF SURVEY RESULTS 35 (Dec. 1, 1975). These figures closely replicate those for serious

automobile accidents for which 74 percent of injury losses is for wage loss, 22 percent

for medical losses, and four percent for other expenses. U.S.
TIoN,

MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH

LOSSES AND

DEP'T OF TRANSPORTA-

THEIR COMPENSATION

IN

THE

UNITED

1977]

CONTRACTING

FOR No-FAULT

No one seriously suggests that social security will be extended in the

foreseeable future to cover middle class wage loss. Thus, horrendous
losses from personal injuries -

uncompensated by any social insur-

ance scheme - will unquestionably continue for the indefinite future.'
No-fault auto insurance has been much easier to implement than
will be no-fault insurance for many other kinds of accidents. In the
case of automobile insurance, there already existed a widespread system of fault liability insurance, mutually applicable to both parties
involved in the accident, that could be readily transferred into a no-fault
loss insurance system. There was also little fear that the transformation would impose new and frightening burdens on either party.
Furthermore, the activity of driving an automobile involved a sufficiently known danger; thus a no-fault statute could manageably and
predictably define who was to be required to pay for what loss. These
factors do not apply to many of the other kinds of accidents. When an

individual goes to a doctor, the doctor may have liability insurance
that may pay the patient in the event of a malpractice suit, but the
patient has no similar liability insurance to pay the doctor. Nor can
the physician readily agree to substitute no-fault insurance, through
which payments are made regardless of how any adverse result were
caused, for his fault liability insurance. Surely a doctor who treats a
patient with a heart condition would resist a requirement that he cover

any further medical expense and wage loss whenever such a patient
takes a turn for the worse. 9
But there is a way to apply no-fault insurance to many types of
accidents. Businesses or professionals could select all, or just certain,
risks of personal injury that their activities typically create and agree
to pay for out-of-pocket losses when injury results from those risks. 10
The incentive to elect no-fault insurance would be that to the extent and only to the extent - that a guarantee of no-fault insurance payment exists at the time of the accident, no claim based on fault (or,
A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 6 (March 1971). (These
figures were computed using the losses listed in Table 2 for Medical Expenses, Wage
Loss, and Other Expenses.)
8. J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No-FAULT INSURANCE FOR
STATES:

PRODUCTS AND SERVICES

75-79 (1975)

[hereinafter cited

as O'CONNELL, ENDING IN-

SULT TO INJURY].

9. Id. at 72-73.
10. For a draft statute implementing this proposal, see O'Connell, An Elective
No-Fault Liability Statute, 1975 INS. L.J. 261 [hereinafter cited as O'Connell, NoFault Statute]. Although the statute is drafted for enactment by a state legislature,
the bill could be adapted easily to enactment by Congress. For a discussion of federal

jurisdiction over such matters, see
note 8, at 161-62.

O'CONNELL, ENDING

INSULT TO INJURY,

supra
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in the case of products liability, a defect) would be allowed. As a
result, the elector would be allowed to avoid paying for (1) lawyers
on both sides arguing over the question of fault or product defect,
(2) a victim's pain and suffering, and (3) losses already paid by
some other source such as Blue Cross. In other words, the payor
would stand ready to pay more victims but to pay each victim much
less. Under such a scheme, the stigma of liability would be substantially, and often totally, avoided. Payment would be made on the
morally neutral ground that the accident was just that - an "accident" - rather than being made on the basis of defective manufacture
or professional malpractice. Two examples will perhaps illustrate how
elective no-fault liability would work for health care providers and
allied endeavors.
A pharmaceutical house, knowing of the possibility of side effects
from a new drug, could agree to pay the cost of those side effects in
the few persons affected whenever they occur. This automatic payment would avoid lengthy, bitter, and expensive litigation over such
things as the adequacy of warnings and the nature of the idiosyncratic
condition of the person suffering loss."
A doctor, realizing the inevitable risks of certain neurological
complications from spinal anesthesia, could agree to pay automatically
any further medical expenses or wage loss stemming from those complications when they occur. This method would obviate the lengthy,
bitter, and expensive litigation over the extent to which the complications were caused by medical error, or the patient's preexisting condition. 2
In each case the prior agreement to make such no-fault payments
would supplant any claim based on fault, just as happens under no-fault
11. Elective no-fault insurance, as the above example indicates, might apply not
only to medical services but to products of all kinds. It could also apply to such
matters as owners' and occupiers' liability. See O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO IN-

juRY, supra note 8, chs. 2 and 4.
12. In a 1974 article, Havighurst and Tancredi listed some compensable events,
compiled in a meeting with a group of orthopedists, that arise from adverse consequences of surgical treatment. They included, for example, postoperative infections,

thrombophlebitis and embolism, catheter infections, allergic and toxic reactions to
antibiotic and other drugs, blood transfusion reactions, foreign bodies, growth deformity secondary to bone injury, Volkmann's contracture and other consequences from
casts, and failure of healing of fractures (including malunion, nonunion and delayed
union). Havighurst and Tancredi, Medical Adversity Insurance - A No-Fault Ap-

proach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INs. L.J. 69, 76, originally
appearing in the Spring 1973 issue of THE MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND QUARTERLY.
For a more comprehensive list of compensable events and discussion thereof, see
Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance" - Has Its Time Comet, 1975 DUKE L.J.
1233, 1256-63, quoted in O'Connell, An Alternative, supra note 5, at 525-28.
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auto insurance. Furthermore, businesses or professionals could be
allowed to limit the amount of no-fault benefits for which they are
liable to multiples of, for example, $10,000;13

enabling legislation

would grant a corresponding exemption from tort suits. The exemption
would equal the no-fault benefits, but would be applied separately
against damages for economic loss and against damages for pain and
suffering. For example, with no-fault benefits of $20,000, there would
be an exemption of $20,000 against any finding of out-of-pocket loss
under a tort claim and a further exemption of $20,000 against damages for pain and suffering.14 Certainly astute businesses or professionals, concerned about 'skyrocketing liability premiums under
present law, would be inclined to study the costs of elective no-fault
liability in comparison to regular tort liability. For at least some
13. Concerning the fear of the costs of unlimited benefits, see O'CoNNELL, ENDING
supra note 8, at 73-75, 79-80. Some studies have indicated that
at least in the matter of gross costs, the cost of paying for unlimited medical expenses
(as opposed to wage losses, as well) under an insurance mechanism need not be too
forbidding. (On the unmanageability of wage losses, see note 7 and accompanying
text supra.) According to a statement submitted to the U.S. House Subcommittee on
Consumer Protection and Finance by the National Association of Casualty and Surety
agents, "Regarding the cost to the consumer of unlimited medical benefits coverage,
a 1974 report on the subject pointed out that the frequency of large medical hospital
and rehabilitation expenses in auto accident cases is so low that unlimited medical
benefits can be provided for 0.1% more than the premium for $50,000 of such coverage." NATIONAL UNDERWRITER (Property & Cas. ed.) Sept. 5, 1975, at 13. On the
other hand underestimations of the costs of unlimited insurance under Medicare and
Medicaid have made many wary of the unpredictable costs of new and explosively
more inclusive health coverage. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY, supra note 8,
at 74. Even if the costs are manageable, some smaller insurers insist that they would
be vulnerable to being wiped out by several large claims. This is disputed in the
above-mentioned report to the U.S. House Subcommittee:
Further, there is no evidence to our knowledge to show that the requirement
of unlimited medical, hospital and rehabilitation benefits will so increase reinsurance costs for smaller insurance companies that it may put some of them out of
business. This has certainly not been the case with workers' compensation laws
in the 47 states which place no limit on workmen's compensation medical
benefits.
NATIONAL UNDERWRITER (Property & Cas. ed.) Sept. 5, 1975, at 13.
INSULT TO INJURY,

14. The reason for a separate tort exemption for pain and suffering, in addition
to one for out-of-pocket loss, is discussed in R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC
PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VIcTIM 442 (1965). Unless there were a tort exemption
for pain and suffering, an accident victim would still be able profitably to assert a
tort claim. Although the claim for out-of-pocket loss would be reduced by the
out-of-pocket exemption, the fact that pain and suffering is often reckoned as a
multiple of economic loss means that the victim would still benefit from hiring a
lawyer, paid on a contingent fee, to assert his tort claim for pain and suffering.
This would reduce any advantage of the tort exemption.
Why, though, is this separate tort exemption defined in terms of a common law
finding of pain and suffering rather than under some of the more objective tests such
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categories of injuries, they might find it advantageous to pay on a
no-fault basis only for out-of-pocket loss. The limitation of liability to
pecuniary losses that exceed amounts already paid from other sources'"
would eliminate payments in most cases of lesser injuries and would
substantially reduce payments in cases of greater injuries. In addition,
as suggested earlier, all parties would save the huge amounts now
spent on attorneys and expert witnesses in attempting to resolve the
intractable question of whether fault or a product defect caused the
accident.
The normal tort system is so wasteful that the availability of
such a no-fault option would encourage many businesses and professionals at least to develop data and to evaluate which system of
compensation would better suit their needs. Even for those whose costs
would not be significantly lower, freedom from the animosity of the
tort liability system would make elective no-fault insurance an attractive alternative. One senses that many health care providers - even
surgeons - can accept their presently high malpractice premiums.
But the uncertainty over whether the frequency and average cost of
claims will become stable, coupled with the indignity of the present
accusatory system, makes them frantic. No-fault insurance provides
more certain criteria for determining both claims frequency and claims
cost by substituting objective data for actuarial predictions of future
jury reactions and by eliminating the unpredictable "pain and suffering"
factor. No-fault also eliminates the stigma in being responsible for
losses. But if the costs of applying elective no-fault to certain risks and
procedures are too large, then health care providers can simply refuse
to elect coverage for those risks. Forbes magazine in an article on
elective no-fault insurance stated: "It can be applied where it works
and ignored where it doesn't. An accurate check on costs and benefits
can be kept at each step of the way.' 1 6 The experience under
Michigan's no-fault auto insurance law illustrates the range of savings
available under no-fault insurance as opposed to traditional tort liability. Coverage under no-fault provides unlimited medical benefits,
$36,000 of wage loss, and residual tort liability of $20,000 (beyond
no-fault's tort exemption) in return for premiums that are no higher
as the amount of medical bills or the number of days of disability? The answer is
that unlike such a more objective test, a pain and suffering yardstick does not present
a precise target at which a plaintiff's lawyer and his client can aim, confident that
if only the client amasses a few more medical bills or stays out of work a little
longer, the tort threshold will be surpassed. See O'Connell, No-Fault Liability by
Contract for Doctors, Manufacturers, Retailers and Others, 1975 INS. L.J. 531, 535 n.8.
15. See text following note 10 supra.

16. FORBES, Sept. 1, 1975, at 64.
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(and often significantly less) than what formerly provided a total
of $20,000 tort liability coverage !1
Many people will ask why a doctor who may be guilty of gross
negligence in injuring his patients should escape with paying his
patient little or no damages. Such an outcome might occur under
elective no-fault liability when a patient's out-of-pocket losses are
largely or completely compensated by his own collateral sources. The
answer is that tort liability should not be the principal device for
punishing egregiously negligent conduct. It is grossly inefficient for
such purposes because it requires the expenditure of huge sums of
money, yet "punishes" relatively few wrongful acts. And finally, even
when those few wrongful acts lead to civil sanctions, the perpetrators
are not punished, but serve only as a conduit to a large insurance
pool made up of contributions from all health care providers and,
ultimately, their patients. (Note that the elective no-fault liability
act does preserve common law tort liability for intentional wrongs in
order to cover the relatively few cases of criminal neglect.)'
The fear that a change to no-fault insurance for injuries arising
from medical treatment will lessen deterrence of unsafe medical procedures and conduct is also groundless. That has not been the experience
with the system of no-fault workers' compensation."9 Furthermore the
present system itself is not very effective as a deterrent. 0 There are
17. On the relative success of auto no-fault in providing more certain and
expeditious payment to traffic victims, see Bovbjerg, The Impact of No-Fault Auto
Insurance on Massachusetts Courts, 11 NEW ENGLAND L. REv. 325 (1976); Clark &
Waterson, "No-Fault" in Delaware, 6 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 225 (1974) ; Little,
No-Fault Auto Reparation in Florida: An Empirical Examination of Some of Its
effects, 9 MIcH. J.L. REFORM 1 (1975) ; O'Connell, Operation of No-Fault Auto
Laws: A Survey of the Surveys, 56 NEB. L. RPv. 23 (1977) ; Widiss, Massachusetts
No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Its Impact on the Legal Profession, 56 BOSTON

U.L. REv. 323 (1976) ; Widiss, Accident Victims Under No-Fault Automobile Insurance: A Massachusetts Survey, 61 IOWA L. REv. 1 (1975). See also HENDERSON,
Report on the Status and Effect of No-Fault Insurance Schemes for Automobile
Accidents in the United States (submitted to the Special Committee on the Uniform
Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act of the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, June 26, 1976).
In sum, the general consensus of the literature is that no-fault has been
largely successful, though hampered by such factors as inflation and tort thresholds
that eliminate too few claims based on fault. See Wall Street J., Jan. 21, 1976, at 1,
col. 6.
18. See O'Connell, No-Fault Statute, supra note 10, at 280 n.69.
19. See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, TORTS § 12.4 at 757 (1956).
20. As to lack of deterrence achieved by the present common law medical malpractice system, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 14-18 (1973)
[hereinafter
cited as HEW REPORT]. For a summary see O'Connell, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY,
supra note 8, at 42--44.

[VOL. 36

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

indications that malpractice claims work a greater hardship against
the safest doctors and hospitals, which employ the most innovative
and advanced procedures, rather than on the doctors and hospitals
that are the least safe. 2 In addition it appears that malpractice cases
figure very little in accreditation or disciplinary proceedings for and
by doctors and hospitals." Such litigation is rightly viewed as often
being a private fight carried on in a circus atmosphere that is utterly
unreliable for purposes of professional review and discipline.
There is precedent for such an elective approach to no-fault accident law in the workers' compensation laws enacted early in this
century. These statutes were passed in order to obviate certain constitutional objections, no longer seen as valid, to compulsory workers'
compensation laws.28 They allowed employers to elect coverage under
no-fault workers' compensation for employee injuries, thereby avoiding
traditional common law liability based on fault. It is not without
significance that no-fault workers' compensation laws reflected the
enlightened and compassionate concern of many employers for employee injuries.2 4 Elective no-fault liability insurance for medical
services would thus allow health care providers to extend to their
patients the much more humane system of no-fault payment that has
long been applicable to industrial and commercial employees.
My initial proposal for elective no-fault insurance envisioned
some form of enabling legislation similar to that adopted for elective
workers' compensation statutes.2 5 But I now propose, pending enactment of legislation authorizing elective no-fault liability, that health
21. See

STATE OF NEW

PRACtiCE, REPORT

169 (1976)

YORK, SPECIAL ADVISORY

[hereinafter cited as

PANEL ON

MEDICAL MAL-

REPORT].

22. Cf. How State Medical Society Executives Size Up Professional Liability,
164 J.A.M.A. 580-82 (1957).
23. For general discussion of the history of workmen's compensation and of the
early constitutional objections to both elective and compulsory forms of workmen's
compensation statutes, see 1 W. SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 9-76

(1941); H.

BRADBURY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW

53-55 (1917). The Supreme

Court settled most of these constitutional questions in a series of decisions handed
down in 1917. See New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917) (holding
that New York's compulsory workmen's compensation statute did not violate the
due process provision of the fourteenth amendment in imposing liability on an
employer without his consent and without his fault) ; accord, Mountain Timber Co. v.
Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917) ; see also Hawkins v. Bleakley, 243 U.S. 210 (1917)
(holding that Iowa's elective workmen's compensation statute did not violate the

equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment);
TO INJURY, supra note 8, at 101.
24.

NATIONAL

O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT

COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

PENDIUM ON WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

25. See note 10 supra.

16-17 (1973).

LAWS, COM-
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care providers go ahead and accomplish the same thing by contract
without legislation.
Doctors are already required to impart extensive information to
patients under the doctrine of informed consent. A 1973 report of
the HEW Secretary's Commission on medical malpractice describes
this doctrine as follows:
Where a patient gives his express consent to a surgical
procedure or particular course of therapy, the physician may nevertheless be held liable if the patient can show that he was not
adequately informed of the risks and consequences of the operative
procedure or course of therapy. In short, the law requires that
the consent be an effective or "informed" one so that the patient
can make an intelligent choice from among the various courses of
possible treatment or to refuse treatment altogether. 6
In view of the already extensive information required to be imparted
by doctors to patients concerning proposed treatment, why could not
doctors, even without the benefit of enabling legislation, offer to
patients, before any treatment, the choice of being covered for certain
or all adverse results by no-fault insurance? This compensation scheme
would produce the same limitation on common law liability envisaged
under an elective no-fault statute 27 as well as the elimination of claims
based on negligence for designated "accidents" that may occur with
actuarial predictability during a stay in a hospital. In many hospitals
patients already sign an agreement, as part of admission, that requires
any future dispute concerning injuries to be arbitrated. 8 Such an
agreement could also provide for exclusive no-fault payment for designated injuries. But lacking a statute, as happens with arbitration
agreements, the doctor or hospital should not refuse, nor be permitted
to refuse, treatment if the patient declines the no-fault method of
compensation. Such agreements should not be used at all for emergency
treatments. 9
26. HEW REPORT, supra note 20, at 29.
27. See notes 10-12 and accompanying text supra.
28. See REPORT, supra note 21, at 45-47.
29. As one means of guaranteeing patient choice, an insurance commissioner whose permission to offer elective no-fault liability contracts is arguably required
(R. KEFTON, INSURANcE LAW: BAsIc TEXT 71-72, 543-45, 550-53 (1971) ; O'CoNN=,
ENDINr, INSULT TO INJURY, supra note 8, at 155-56) - could require patient choice
as a prerequisite to approval. Even without such safeguards, if a patient elects the
proffered no-fault liability coverage under threat or refusal of treatment by a
health care provider, a court might well void the election at the patient's option and
thereby allow the patient's common law tort claim. If a doctor were simply to refuse
to treat a person unless an elective no-fault agreement were signed, a person not receiving treatment might well have a cause of action against the doctor for such
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Such no-fault agreements would probably be attacked in the
courts as unconscionable.30 An example of the way courts apply this
doctrine of unconscionability is the 1963 California Supreme Court case
of Tunkl v. Regents of University of California." The UCLA Medical
Center required as a condition of admission to its hospital that patients
sign a release absolving the hospital "from any and all liability for
the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of its employees, if the
hospital has used due care in selecting its employees. 3' 2 This release
contravened, of course, the normal common law rule of respondeat
superior, which makes an employer liable for the negligent acts of its
employees regardless of its care in selecting them. A patient sued,
asserting the hospital's normal common law liability despite the agreement. The Supreme Court of California agreed and refused to enforce
the agreement because it was basically unfair.
As this case illustrates, judicial abhorrence of disclaimers of
common law personal injury liability is likely to be encountered where
disclaimers or limitations attempt to absolve the defendant totally
or partially from normal liability for personal injuries. But such condemnations should not be applied to obstruct those modifications in
liability that would net patients as a group more money more expeditiously than the common law tort system by eliminating, among
other things, cumbersome criteria for payment. 33
refusal to treat - especially (but perhaps not necessarily only) when he or she
had previously been a patient of the doctor. McCoid, The Care Required of Medical
Practitioners,12 VAND. L. REv. 549, 553-57 (1959).
30. For an extended discussion of the issue of elective no-fault contracts as
"unconscionable," and a defense of them as not being so, see O'Connell, Elective
No-Fault Liability by Contract With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL.
L.F. 59; O'Connell, No-Fault Liability by Contract for Doctors, Manufacturers,
Retailers and Others, 1975 INs. L.J. 531; O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning
Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault Insurance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN.
L. REv. 501 (1976).
31. 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
32. Id. at 94, 383 P.2d at 442, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
That an exculpatory agreement allowing a more favorable bargain between
health care provider and patient might well be upheld is indicated by the court's
emphasis that the agreement in Tunkl "makes no provision whereby a purchaser may
pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence." Id. at 100-01,
383 P.2d at 446, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
33. Professor Marc Franklin has summarized the objections of the courts that
lead them to strike down as unconscionable disclaimers of liability for personal
injury:
In personal injury situations, apart from a vague uneasiness about bargaining
inequality and the evidentiary problem of notice to the buyer, there are other
tangible concerns. These include the danger of a decrease in care by the seller
[of goods or services]; the buyer's inability to discover the nature and quantum
of the risk; the seller's ability to acquire insurance more efficiently; the buyer's
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CONTRACTING

FOR NO-FAULT

In sum, contracts that incorporate elective no-fault liability for
personal injury are far from being unconscionable. They would, where
feasible, bestow on victims of injuries incurred in the course of medical
treatment or product use the same benefits and bargains of compensation
that have long been recognized in the area of industrial accidents (and,
more recently automobile accidents) to be fairer than common law
remedies. And so, businesses or health care providers need not wait
for an enabling statute in order to institute elective no-fault liability
insurance. They should proceed to assume such liability now - by
contract, with or without a statute.
There is one final caution. Given the timidity of the insurance
industry's response to no-fault auto insurance (it took several generations for even a portion of the industry to see the obvious merit of
the idea, and many in the industry are still either indifferent or hostile
to the notion), the impetus for reform of the tort system as it applies
to health care providers will have to come from them, as insureds,
rather than from their insurers. As suggested earlier,34 the example
of the history of workers' compensation is a reminder: it was enlightened employer-insureds who led the way in achieving that early
and lasting reform against ,the opposition of insurers, lawyers, and
many in industry. Elective no-fault liability for product and servicerelated injuries will probably have to follow the same pattern.
inability to protect himself to the same extent the law would protect him; and the
likelihood that the buyer's misfortune will have serious repercussions on his
family and ultimately on the community. I consider this a massive indictment of
the disclaimer device.
Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-

ProductCases, 18 STAN. L. REv. 974, 1019 (1973).
But apart from unequal bargaining power, which alone is no basis for

striking down a fair deal [Id. at 996;

UNIFORM COMMn RCIAL CODE §

1; Leff, Unconscionability and the Code

-

2-320, Comment

The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA.

L. REv. 485, 508 (1976)], none of these objections would seem to apply to elective
no-fault liability. Notice can certainly be supplied to the patient prior to surgery or
other medical procedures; no-fault liability actually provides a patient with better
protection than he has under the capricious common law tort system; elective no-fault,
in providing prompt and effective reparation eases the burdens on a victim, his family
and the community; elective no-fault maintains the economic advantages of allocating
the burden of obtaining insurance on the health care providers; in imposing absolute
liability on the health care provider, elective no-fault should not result in any decrease in care by the provider. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.

34. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.

